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Abstract
Algebraical fixpoint theory is an invaluable instrument for study-
ing semantics of logics. For example, all major semantics of logic pro-
gramming, autoepistemic logic, default logic and more recently, ab-
stract argumentation have been shown to be induced by the different
types of fixpoints defined in approximation fixpoint theory (AFT).
In this paper, we add a new type of fixpoint to AFT: a grounded
fixpoint of lattice operator O : L→ L is defined as a lattice element
x ∈ L such that O(x) = x and for all v ∈ L such that O(v ∧ x) ≤ v,
it holds that x ≤ v. On the algebraical level, we show that all
grounded fixpoints are minimal fixpoints approximated by the well-
founded fixpoint and that all stable fixpoints are grounded. On the
logical level, grounded fixpoints provide a new mathematically sim-
ple and compact type of semantics for any logic with a (possibly
non-monotone) semantic operator. We explain the intuition under-
lying this semantics in the context of logic programming by pointing
out that grounded fixpoints of the immediate consequence operator
are interpretations that have no non-trivial unfounded sets. We also
analyse the complexity of the induced semantics.
Summarised, grounded fixpoint semantics is a new, probably the
simplest and most compact, element in the family of semantics that
capture basic intuitions and principles of various non-monotonic log-
ics.
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Abstract
Algebraical fixpoint theory is an invaluable instrument
for studying semantics of logics. For example, all major
semantics of logic programming, autoepistemic logic,
default logic and more recently, abstract argumentation
have been shown to be induced by the different types
of fixpoints defined in approximation fixpoint theory
(AFT). In this paper, we add a new type of fixpoint to
AFT: a grounded fixpoint of lattice operator O : L→ L
is defined as a lattice element x ∈ L such that O(x) =
x and for all v ∈ L such that O(v ∧ x) ≤ v, it holds
that x ≤ v. On the algebraical level, we show that all
grounded fixpoints are minimal fixpoints approximated
by the well-founded fixpoint and that all stable fix-
points are grounded. On the logical level, grounded fix-
points provide a new mathematically simple and com-
pact type of semantics for any logic with a (possibly
non-monotone) semantic operator. We explain the in-
tuition underlying this semantics in the context of logic
programming by pointing out that grounded fixpoints of
the immediate consequence operator are interpretations
that have no non-trivial unfounded sets. We also analyse
the complexity of the induced semantics.
Summarised, grounded fixpoint semantics is a new,
probably the simplest and most compact, element in
the family of semantics that capture basic intuitions and
principles of various non-monotonic logics.
1 Introduction
Motivated by structural analogies in the semantics of several
non-monotonic logics, Denecker, Marek, and Truszczyn´ski
(2000) developed an algebraic theory that defines different
types of fixpoints for a so-called approximating bilattice
operator, called supported, Kripke-Kleene, stable and well-
founded fixpoints. In the context of logic programming, they
found that Fitting’s immediate consequence operator is an
approximating operator of the two-valued immediate conse-
quence operator and that its four different types of fixpoints
correspond exactly with the four major, equally named se-
mantics of logic programs. They also identified approximat-
ing operators for default logic (DL) and autoepistemic logic
(AEL) and showed that the fixpoint theory induces all main
and some new semantics in these fields (Denecker, Marek,
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and Truszczyn´ski 2003). By showing that Konolige’s map-
ping from DL to AEL preserves the approximating operator,
they resolved an old research question regarding the nature
of these two logics: AEL and DL are “just” two different
dialects of autoepistemic reasoning (Denecker, Marek, and
Truszczyn´ski 2011).
The study of these approximating operators is called ap-
proximation fixpoint theory (AFT). It is now commonly
used to define semantics of extensions of logic programs,
such as logic programs with aggregates (Pelov, Denecker,
and Bruynooghe 2007) and HEX logic programs (Antic,
Eiter, and Fink 2013). Vennekens, Gilis, and Denecker
(2006) used AFT in an algebraic modularity study for logic
programming, AEL and DL. Recently, Strass (2013) showed
that many semantics from Dung’s argumentation frame-
works (AFs) and abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs)
can be obtained by direct applications of AFT and Bogaerts
et al. (2014) defined the causal logic FO(C) as an instantia-
tion of AFT. This work suggests that fixpoint theory, despite
its high level of abstraction, captures certain fundamental
intuitions and cognitive principles in a range of logics and
sorts of human knowledge. It is this observation that pro-
vides the basic motivation for the present study.
In Section 3, we extend AFT with a new type of fixpoint:
a point x in a lattice L is a grounded fixpoint of operator
O : L → L if O(x) = x and for all v ∈ L such that
O(x ∧ v) ≤ v, it holds that x ≤ v. In Section 4, we dis-
cuss the relation between grounded fixpoints and the other
fixpoints defined by AFT. In particular, we show that all (ul-
timate) stable fixpoints are grounded and that all grounded
fixpoints are minimal fixpoints approximated by the (ulti-
mate) well-founded fixpoint in the bilattice. In general there
are minimal fixpoints that are not grounded, and grounded
fixpoints that are not stable. If the well-founded fixpoint is
“exact”, the well-founded fixpoint is the unique grounded
and stable fixpoint of O.
Grounded fixpoints have several appealing properties.
First of all, a grounded fixpoint is a purely algebraical con-
cept. As such, it can be used in all fields where AFT is ap-
plied. Secondly, a first step in the application of AFT for a
lattice operator O is to choose a bilattice operator that ap-
proximates O. In contrast, grounded fixpoints are defined
directly in terms of the original operator O. Thirdly, their
definition formalises and generalises well-known intuitions.
In the context of logic programming, which we discuss
in Section 5, the algebraic results show that grounded fix-
points induce a semantics that is slightly more “liberal”
than stable semantics: all stable models are grounded (i.e.,
we identified a property all stable models have in com-
mon) but also every grounded fixpoint is approximated by
the well-founded model; the differences collapse in case
the well-founded model is two-valued. We will see that
for logic programming, this semantics is simple and intu-
itive: we show that the grounded fixpoints can be charac-
terised in terms of a generalised notion of unfounded set.
Contrary to the more common semantics of logic programs,
grounded fixpoint semantics does not rely on any form of
three-valued logic: It is defined directly in terms of the (two-
valued!) immediate consequence operator. The grounded
fixpoint semantics is very flexible towards language exten-
sions. Currently, much research is being conducted in or-
der to extend stable and well-founded semantics for logic
programs with new language constructs (Pelov, Denecker,
and Bruynooghe 2007; Faber, Pfeifer, and Leone 2011;
Marek, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2008; Balduccini 2013).
Since the grounded fixpoint semantics is completely defined
using the two-valued immediate consequence operator, it
suffices to extend this operator to obtain an extended se-
mantics; this is often trivial. These nice properties come at a
cost: we show that in general, determining whether a logic
program has a grounded fixpoint is ΣP2 -complete. However,
for large classes of programs, grounded fixpoint semantics
coincides with stable semantics. For those programs, we ob-
tained a simple, concise, purely 2-valued and algebraical,
extensible reformulation of the existing semantics.
Proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Summarised, the main contributions of this paper are as
follows. We extend AFT with the notion of a grounded
fixpoint, a fixpoint closely related to stable fixpoints with
similar properties, but that is determined by O, not by the
choice of an approximator. Applied to logic programming
this yields an intuitive, purely two-valued, semantics that is
easily extensible and that formalises well-known intuitions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Lattices and Operators
A poset 〈L,≤〉 is a set L equipped with a partial order ≤,
i.e., a reflexive antisymmetric, transitive relation. If S is a
subset of L, then x is an upper bound, respectively a lower
bound of S if for every s ∈ S, it holds that s ≤ x respec-
tively x ≤ s. An element x is a least upper bound, respec-
tively greatest lower bound of S if it is an upper bound that
is smaller than every other upper bound, respectively a lower
bound that is greater than every other lower bound. If S has
a least upper bound, respectively a greatest lower bound,
we denote it lub(S), respectively glb(S). As is custom, we
sometimes call a greatest lower bound a meet, and a least up-
per bound a join and use the related notations
∧
S = glb(S),
x∧y = glb({x, y}),∨S = lub(S) and x∨y = lub({x, y}).
We call 〈L,≤〉 a complete lattice if every subset of L has a
least upper bound and a greatest lower bound. A complete
lattice has both a least element ⊥ and a greatest element >.
An operator O : L → L is monotone if x ≤ y implies
that O(x) ≤ O(y). An element x ∈ L is a prefixpoint, a
fixpoint, a postfixpoint if O(x) ≤ x, respectively O(x) =
x, x ≤ O(x). Every monotone operator O in a complete
lattice has a least fixpoint, denoted lfp(O), which is alsoO’s
least prefixpoint and the limit (the least upper bound) of the
increasing sequence (xi)i≥0 defined by
• x0 = ⊥,
• xi+1 = O(xi),
• xλ = lub({xi | i < λ}), for limit ordinals λ.
2.2 Logic Programming
In the following sections, we illustrate our abstract results in
the context of logic programming. We recall some prelimi-
naries. We restrict ourselves to propositional logic programs,
but allow arbitrary propositional formulas in rule bodies.
However, AFT has been applied in a much broader context
(Denecker, Bruynooghe, and Vennekens 2012; Pelov, De-
necker, and Bruynooghe 2007; Antic, Eiter, and Fink 2013)
and our results can also be applied in these extensions of
logic programming.
Let Σ be an alphabet, i.e., a collection of symbols which
are called atoms. A literal is an atom p or the negation ¬q of
an atom q. A logic program P is a set of rules r of the form
h ← ϕ, where h is an atom called the head of r, denoted
head(r), and ϕ is a propositional formula called the body of
r, denoted body(r). An interpretation I of the alphabet Σ is
an element of 2Σ, i.e., a subset of Σ. The set of interpreta-
tions 2Σ forms a lattice equipped with the order⊆. The truth
value (t or f ) of a propositional formula ϕ in a structure I ,
denoted ϕI is defined as usual. With a logic program P , we
associate an immediate consequence operator (van Emden
and Kowalski 1976) TP that maps a structure I to
TP(I) = {p | ∃r ∈ P : head(r) = p ∧ body(r)I = t}.
3 Grounded Fixpoints
Let 〈L,≤〉 be a complete lattice and O : L → L a lattice
operator, fixed throughout this entire section. We start by
giving the most central definition of this text, namely the
notion of groundedness.
Definition 3.1 (Grounded). We call x ∈ L grounded for O
if for each v ∈ L such thatO(v∧x) ≤ v, it holds that x ≤ v.
The intuition behind this concept is easiest to explain if
we assume that the elements of L are sets of “facts” of some
kind and the ≤ relation is the subset relation between such
sets. In this case, a point x is grounded if it contains only
facts that are sanctioned by the operator O, in the sense that
if we remove them from x, then the operator will add at least
one of them again. The above definition captures this idea,
by using a set v ∈ L to remove all elements not in v from x.
If their removal is not contradicted by O, i.e., O does not
re-derive any removed element (O(x ∧ v) ≤ v), then these
elements cannot be part of the grounded point (x ≤ v).
Proposition 3.2. If O is a monotone operator and x is
grounded for O then x is a postfixpoint of O that is less than
or equal to lfp(O), i.e., x ≤ O(x) and x ≤ lfp(O).
Example 3.3. The converse of Proposition 3.2 does not
hold. Consider the following logic program P:{
p.
q ← p ∨ q.
}
Its immediate consequence operator TP is represented by
the following graph, where full edges express the order re-
lation (to be precise, the ≤ relation is the reflexive transitive
closure of these edges) and the dotted edges represent the
operator:
> = {p, q}
WW
{p}
6655
{q}
hh ii
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66hhcc
TP is a monotone operator with least fixpoint>. Also, {q} is
a postfixpoint of TP since TP({q}) = > ≥ {q}. However,
{q} is not grounded since TP({q}∧{p}) = TP(⊥) = {p} ≤
{p}, while {q} 6≤ {p}.
Proposition 3.4. All grounded fixpoints of O are minimal
fixpoints of O.
Example 3.5. The converse of Proposition 3.4 does not
hold. Consider the logic program P:{
p← p.
q←¬p ∨ q.
}
This logic program corresponds has as immediate conse-
quence operator TP :
> = {p, q}
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{q}
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In this case, {p} is a minimal fixpoint of TP , but {p} is not
grounded since TP({p} ∧ {q}) = TP(⊥) = {q}.
Proposition 3.6. A monotone operator has exactly one
grounded fixpoint, namely its least fixpoint.
4 Grounded Fixpoints and AFT
4.1 Preliminaries: AFT
Given a lattice L, approximation fixpoint theory makes uses
of the bilattice L2. We define two projection functions for
pairs as usual: (x, y)1 = x and (x, y)2 = y. Pairs (x, y) ∈
L2 are used to approximate all elements in the interval
[x, y] = {z | x ≤ z∧z ≤ y}. We call (x, y) ∈ L2 consistent
if x ≤ y, that is, if [x, y] is non-empty. We use Lc to denote
the set of consistent elements. Elements (x, x) ∈ Lc are
called exact. We sometimes abuse notation and use the tuple
(x, y) and the interval [x, y] interchangeably. The precision
ordering on L2 is defined as (x, y)≤p (u, v) if x ≤ u and
v ≤ y. In case (u, v) is consistent, this means that (x, y) ap-
proximates all elements approximated by (u, v), or in other
words that [u, v] ⊆ [x, y]. If L is a complete lattice, then
〈L2, ≤p 〉 is also a complete lattice.
AFT studies fixpoints of lattice operators O : L → L
through operators approximating O. An operator A : L2 →
L2 is an approximator of O if it is ≤p -monotone, and has
the property that for all x, O(x) ∈ A(x, x). Approximators
are internal in Lc (i.e., map Lc into Lc). As usual, we restrict
our attention to symmetric approximators: approximators A
such that for all x and y, A(x, y)1 = A(y, x)2. Denecker,
Marek, and Truszczyn´ski (2004) showed that the consis-
tent fixpoints of interest (supported, stable, well-founded)
are uniquely determined by an approximator’s restriction to
Lc, hence, sometimes we only define approximators on Lc.
AFT studies fixpoints of O using fixpoints of A. The A-
Kripke-Kleene fixpoint is the ≤p -least fixpoint ofA and has
the property that it approximates all fixpoints ofO. A partial
A-stable fixpoint is a pair (x, y) such that x = lfp(A(·, y)1)
and y = lfp(A(x, ·)2), where A(·, y)1 denotes the opera-
tor L → L : x 7→ A(x, y)1 and analogously for A(x, ·)2.
The A-well-founded fixpoint is the least precise partial A-
stable fixpoint. An A-stable fixpoint of O is a fixpoint x
of O such that (x, x) is a partial A-stable fixpoint. This is
equivalent with the condition that x = lfp(A(·, x)1). The
A-Kripke-Kleene fixpoint of O can be constructed by iter-
atively applying A, starting from (⊥,>). For the A-well-
founded fixpoint, a similar constructive characterisation has
been worked out by Denecker and Vennekens (2007).
In general, a lattice operator O : L → L has a family of
approximators of different precision. Denecker, Marek, and
Truszczyn´ski (2004) showed that there exists a most pre-
cise approximator, UO, called the ultimate approximator of
O. This operator is defined by UO : Lc → Lc : (x, y) 7→
(
∧
O([x, y]),
∨
O([x, y])). Semantics defined using the ulti-
mate approximator have as advantage that they only depend
on O since the approximator can be derived from O. It was
shown that for any approximator A, all A-stable fixpoints
are UO-stable fixpoints, and the UO-well-founded fixpoint is
always more precise than the A-well-founded fixpoint. We
refer to UO-stable fixpoints as ultimate stable fixpoints of
O and to the UO-well-founded fixpoint as the ultimate well-
founded fixpoint of O.
AFT and Logic Programming In the context of logic
programming, elements of the bilattice
(
2Σ
)2
are partial
interpretations, pairs I = (I1, I2) of interpretations. The
pair (I1, I2) approximates all interpretations I ′ with I1 ⊆
I ′ ⊆ I2. We are mostly concerned with consistent (or, three-
valued) interpretations: tuples I = (I1, I2) with I1 ⊆ I2.
For such an interpretation, the atoms in I1 are true (t) in I,
the atoms in I2\I1 are unknown (u) in I and the other atoms
are false (f ) in I. If I is a three-valued interpretation, and ϕ
a formula, we write ϕI for the standard three-valued valua-
tion based on the Kleene truth tables (Kleene 1938). An in-
terpretation I corresponds to the partial interpretation (I, I).
If I = (I1, I2) is a (partial) interpretation, and U ⊆ Σ, we
write I[U : f ] for the (partial) interpretation that equals I on
all elements not in U and that interprets all elements in U as
f , i.e., the interpretation (I1 \ U, I2 \ U).
Several approximators have been defined for logic pro-
grams. The most common is Fitting’s immediate conse-
quence operator ΨP (Fitting 2002), a direct generalisa-
tion of TP to partial interpretations. Denecker, Marek, and
Truszczyn´ski (2000) showed that the well-founded fixpoint
of ΨP is the well-founded model of P (Van Gelder, Ross,
and Schlipf 1991) and that ΨP -stable fixpoints are exactly
the stable models of P (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988).
Contrary to classical stable and well-founded semantics,
their ultimate counterparts have the nice property that they
are insensitive to equivalence preserving rewritings of the
bodies of rules. If two logic programs P and P ′ have the
same immediate consequence operator, then their ultimate
stable (respectively ultimate well-founded) models are the
same. For example consider programs P = {p ← p ∨ ¬p}
and P ′ = {p.}. Even though the body of the rule defin-
ing p in P is a tautology, {p} is not a stable model of P
(while it is a stable model of P ′). However, the ultimate sta-
ble semantics treats these two programs identically. How-
ever, this property comes at a cost. Denecker, Marek, and
Truszczyn´ski (2004) showed that deciding whether P has
an ultimate stable model is Σ2P -complete, while that same
task is only NP-complete for classical stable models.
4.2 Grounded Fixpoints and AFT
In this section, we discuss how groundedness relates to AFT.
More concretely, we show that all (ultimate) stable fixpoints
are grounded and that all grounded fixpoints are approxi-
mated by the (ultimate) well-founded fixpoint.
Proposition 4.1. All ultimate stable fixpoints of O are
grounded.
Example 4.2. The converse of Proposition 4.1 does not al-
ways hold. Consider the logic program P:{
p←¬p ∨ q.
q←¬q ∨ p.
}
This logic program has as immediate consequence operator
TP :
> = {p, q}
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> is grounded for TP , since the only v with TP(> ∧ v) =
TP(v) ≤ v is > itself. However, since TP([⊥,>]) = L \
{⊥} and {p} ∧ {q} = ⊥, it follows that∧(TP [⊥,>]) = ⊥.
Thus, lfp(
∧
TP([·,>])) = ⊥. Therefore, > is not an ulti-
mate stable fixpoint of TP .
The fact that all A-stable fixpoints are ultimate stable fix-
points (Denecker, Marek, and Truszczyn´ski 2004) yields:
Corollary 4.3. If A is an approximator of O, then all A-
stable fixpoints are grounded fixpoints of O.
Theorem 4.4. The well-founded fixpoint (u, v) of a sym-
metric approximator A of O approximates all grounded fix-
points of O.
Corollary 4.5. If the well-founded fixpoint of a symmetric
approximator A of O is exact, then this point is the unique
grounded fixpoint of O.
5 Grounded Fixpoints of Logic Programs
In this section, we discuss grounded fixpoints in the con-
text of logic programming. It follows immediately from the
algebraical results (Corollary 4.3 and Theorem 4.4) that sta-
ble models are grounded fixpoints of the immediate conse-
quence operator and that grounded fixpoints are minimal fix-
points approximated by the well-founded model. Grounded
fixpoints can be explained in terms of unfounded sets. Intu-
itively, an unfounded set is a set of atoms that might circu-
larly support themselves, but have no support from outside.
Stated differently, an unfounded set of a logic program P
with respect to an interpretation I is a set U of atoms such
that P provides no support for the truth of any atom in U ,
except possibly support based on the truth of other atoms in
U . Since TP maps an interpretation I to the set of atoms sup-
ported by P in I , the above intuitions are directly formalised
as follows.
Definition 5.1 (2-Unfounded set). LetP be a logic program,
TP the corresponding direct consequence operator and I ∈
2Σ an interpretation. A set U ⊆ Σ is a 2-unfounded set of P
with respect to I if TP(I[U : f ]) ∩ U = ∅.
Thus, U is a 2-unfounded set of P with respect to I if re-
moving all elements of U from I results in a state I[U : f ]
where no atom in U is supported, i.e., TP(I[U : f ]) con-
tains no atoms from U . Definition 5.1 slightly differs from
the original definition of unfounded set by Van Gelder, Ross,
and Schlipf (1991) but it formalises the same intuitions. The
most important difference is that we work in a two-valued
setting, while van Gelder et al. defined unfounded sets in a
three-valued setting. For clarity, we refer to our unfounded
sets as “2-unfounded sets” and to the original definition
as “GRS-unfounded sets”. Our theory does not require any
form of three-valued logic. In Section 6, we extend our def-
inition to a three-valued context and show that the different
notions of unfounded set are equivalent in the context of the
well-founded model construction.
Example 5.2. Let P be the following program:
p← q ∨ r.
q← p.
t ←¬s ∧ ¬r.

Let I be the interpretation {p, q, s, t}. Then U1 = {p, q} is
an unfounded set of P with respect to I since I[U1 : f ] =
{s, t} and in this structure, the bodies of rules defining p and
q are false. More formally, TP(I[U1 : f ])∩U1 = ∅∩U1 = ∅.
U2 = {s, t} is not a 2-unfounded set of P with respect to
I since TP(I[U2 : f ]) ∩ U2 = {p, q, t} ∩ U2 = {t} 6= ∅.
In what follows, we use U c for the set complement of U ,
i.e., U c = Σ \ U .
Proposition 5.3. Let P be a logic program, TP the corre-
sponding direct consequence operator and I ∈ 2Σ an in-
terpretation. A set U ⊆ Σ is a 2-unfounded set of P with
respect to I if and only if TP(I ∧ U c) ≤ U c.
Proposition 5.3 shows that U is a 2-unfounded set if and
only if its complement satisfies the condition on v in Defini-
tion 3.1! This allows us to reformulate the condition that I
is grounded as follows.
Proposition 5.4. A structure I is grounded for TP if and
only if I does not contain any atoms that belong to a 2-
unfounded set U of P with respect to I .
If I is a fixpoint of TP , then all sets U ⊆ Ic are 2-
unfounded sets. We call these 2-unfounded sets trivial. With
this terminology, we find:
Corollary 5.5. A structure I is a grounded fixpoint of TP
if and only if it is a fixpoint of TP and P has no non-trivial
2-unfounded sets with respect to I .
Similarly to ultimate semantics, grounded fixpoints are in-
sensitive to equivalence-preserving rewritings in the bodies
of rules: if P and P ′ are such that TP = TP′ , then the
grounded fixpoints of P and P ′ coincide. Also similar to
ultimate semantics, the above property comes at a cost.
Theorem 5.6. The problem “given a finite propositional
logic program P , decide whether P has a grounded fix-
point” is ΣP2 -complete.
Let us briefly compare grounded fixpoint semantics with
the two most frequently used semantics of logic program-
ming: well-founded and stable semantics. Firstly, it deserves
to be stressed that the three semantics provide different for-
malisations of a similar intuition: a certain minimality cri-
terion for fixpoints (which we called groundedness). Conse-
quently it is to be expected that they often coincide. We es-
tablished that for programs with a two-valued well-founded
model, the three semantics coincide. This sort of programs
is common in applications for deductive databases (Data-
log and extensions (Abiteboul and Vianu 1991)) and for
representing inductive definitions (Denecker and Vennekens
2014). In contrast, well-founded semantics coincides only
seldom with stable semantics in the context of answer set
programming (ASP). We illustrated in Example 4.2 that in
this case, also stable and grounded fixpoint semantics may
disagree. This example is quite unwieldy, as are all such pro-
grams that we found. It led us to expect that for large classes
of ASP programs, both semantics still coincide. For those
programs, we have defined a an elegant, intuitive and con-
cise reformulation of the existing semantics. It is a topic for
future research to search for characteristics of ASP programs
that guarantee that both semantics agree or disagree.
Grounded fixpoint semantics is, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the first purely two-valued and algebraical semantics.
The well-founded semantics explicitly uses three-valued in-
terpretations in the well-founded model construction. Stable
semantics uses three-valued logic implicitly: the Gelfond-
Lifschitz reduct corresponds to an evaluation in a partial in-
terpretation. The ultimate versions of these semantics are
purely algebraical but still refer to three-valued interpreta-
tions (replacing Kleene valuation by supervaluation). Due to
this, ultimate stable and well-founded models are relatively
complex to understand.
Logic Programs with Abstract Constraint Atoms. The
fact that grounded fixpoints semantics is two-valued and al-
gebraical makes it not only easier to understand, but also
to extend the semantics. To illustrate this, we consider
logic programs with abstract constraint atoms as defined by
Marek, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski (2008). An abstract con-
straint is a collection C ⊆ 2Σ. A constraint atom is an
expression of the form C(X), where X ⊆ Σ and C is an
abstract constraint. The goal of such an atom is to model
constraints on subsets of X . The truth value of C(X) in
interpretation I is t if I ∩ X ∈ C and f otherwise. Ab-
stract constraints are a generalisation of pseudo-Boolean
constraints, cardinality constraints, and much more. A de-
terministic logic program is a set of rules of the form1
p← a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an ∧ ¬b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bm,
where p is an atom and the ai and bi are constraint atoms.
The intuition behind such a rule is that p is justified if the
constraints ai are satisfied while the bi are not. This intuition
is captured in an extended immediate consequence operator:
TP(I) = {p | ∃r ∈ P : head(r) = p ∧ body(r)I = t}.
Grounded fixpoints of this operator still represent the same
intuitions: an interpretation I is grounded if it contains no
unfounded sets, or said differently, no atoms without exter-
nal support. Thus, if it contains no set U of atoms such that
TP(I[U : f ]) ∩ U = ∅.
Example 5.7. Let Σ be the alphabet {a, b, c, d} For every i,
let C≥i be the cardinality constraint {X ⊆ Σ | |X| ≥ i}..
Consider the following logic program P over Σ:{
a. b← C≥1(Σ).
c← ¬C≥4(Σ). d← C≥4(Σ).
}
Any interpretation in which d holds is not grounded since
for every I , C≥4(Σ)I[d:f ] = f and thus d 6∈ TP(I[d : f ]).
It can easily be verified that {a, b, c} is the only grounded
fixpoint of P .
This example illustrates that even for complex, abstract
extensions of logic programs, groundedness is an intuitive
property: for any extension, a point is grounded if it con-
tains no self-supporting atoms. Also, it often possible to de-
rive common properties of all grounded fixpoints such as
the fact that d cannot be contained in any of them. Lastly,
groundedness easily extends to these rich formalisms (defin-
ing grounded fixpoints takes one line given the immediate
consequence operator). This is in sharp contrast with more
common semantics of logic programming (such as stable
and well-founded semantics) which are often hard(er) to ex-
tend to richer formalisms, as can be observed by the many
different versions of those semantics that exist for logic pro-
grams with aggregates (Ferraris 2005; Son, Pontelli, and
Elkabani 2006; Pelov, Denecker, and Bruynooghe 2007;
Faber, Pfeifer, and Leone 2011; Gelfond and Zhang 2014).
1Here, we limit ourselves to deterministic programs. In general,
Marek, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski also described nondeterministic
programs. We come back to this issue in Section 6.
6 Discussion
Unfounded Sets. Unfounded sets were first defined by
Van Gelder, Ross, and Schlipf (1991) in their seminal pa-
per introducing the well-founded semantics. Their definition
slightly differs from Definition 5.1.
Definition 6.1 (GRS-Unfounded set). Let P be a logic pro-
gram and I a three-valued interpretation. A set U ⊆ Σ is a
GRS-unfounded set of P with respect to I, if for each rule r
with head(r) ∈ U , body(r)I = f or body(r)I[U :f ] = f .
The first difference between 2-unfounded sets and GRS-
unfounded sets is that GRS-unfounded sets are defined for
three-valued interpretations, while we restricted our atten-
tion to (total) interpretations. Our definition easily gener-
alises to three-valued interpretations using Fitting’s opera-
tor:
Definition 6.2 (3-Unfounded set). LetP be a logic program,
ΨP Fitting’s immediate consequence operator and I a three-
valued interpretation. A set U ⊆ Σ is a 3-unfounded set of
P with respect to I if ΨP(I[U : f ])2 ∩ U = ∅.
This definition formalises the same intuitions as Defini-
tion 5.1: U is a 3-unfounded set if making all atoms in U
false results in a state where none of them can be derived.
The following proposition relates the two notions of un-
founded sets.
Proposition 6.3. LetP be a logic program, I a three-valued
interpretation and U ⊆ Σ. The following hold.
• If U is a 3-unfounded set, then U is a GRS-unfounded set.
• If I[U : f ] is more precise than I, then U is a GRS-
unfounded set if and only if U is a 3-unfounded set.
We showed that for a certain class of interpretations, the
two notions of unfounded sets coincide. Furthermore, Van
Gelder et al. only use unfounded sets to define the well-
founded model construction. It follows immediately from
Lemma 3.4 in (Van Gelder, Ross, and Schlipf 1991) that
every partial interpretation I in that construction with GRS-
unfounded set U satisfies the condition in the second claim
in Proposition 6.3. This means that 3-unfounded sets and
GRS-unfounded sets are equivalent for all interpretations
that are relevant in the original work! Essentially, we pro-
vided a new formalisation of unfounded sets that correctly
formalises the underlying intuitions, and that coincides with
the old definition on all interpretations used in the original
work. Furthermore, our definition is simpler and translates
easily to algebra.
Corollary 5.5, which states that grounded fixpoints are
fixpoints of TP that permit no non-trivial 2-unfounded sets,
might sound familiar. Indeed, it has been shown that an in-
terpretation is a stable model of a logic program if and only
if it is a fixpoint of TP and it permits no non-trivial GRS-
unfounded sets (Lifschitz 2008). This again shows that many
of the intuitions used in Answer Set Programming are also
closely related to the notion of groundedness.
Groundedness and Nondeterminism. In Section 5, we
restricted ourselves to logic programs with abstract con-
straint atoms in the bodies of rules, and we did not allow
them in heads of rules. As argued by Marek, Niemela¨, and
Truszczyn´ski (2008), allowing them as well in heads gives
rise to a nondeterministic generalisation of the immediate
consequence operator. A consistent nondeterministic opera-
tor maps every point x ∈ L to a non-empty set O(x) ⊆ L.
The definition of groundedness can straightforwardly be ex-
tended to this nondeterministic setting: a point x ∈ L is
grounded for nondeterministic operator O, if x ≤ v for all v
such that O(x ∧ v) ≤ v, where we define for a set X ⊆ L
that X ≤ v if x ≤ v for every x ∈ X . A thorough study
of groundedness for nondeterministic operators is out of the
scope of this paper.
Other Definitions of Groundedness. The terminology
“grounded” is heavily overloaded in the literature. This is
not a coincidence since this term often represents similar in-
tuitions. For example Denecker, Marek, and Truszczyn´ski
(2002) argued that ultimate stable models satisfy “some
groundedness condition” without defining this condition.
We formally defined groundedness and showed in Proposi-
tion 4.1 that with this definition, their claim indeed holds.
In 1988, Konolige defined notions of weak, moderate and
strong groundedness in order to formalise some of his in-
tuitions regarding “good” models of autoepistemic theories.
However, as he mentions himself, the closest he got to for-
malising these intuitions was strong groundedness, a syntac-
tical criterion that depends on how a theory is rewritten to a
normal form. We now claim2 that our notion of grounded-
ness formalises his intuitions, or at least, that it works for all
examples he gave!
In Dung’s argumentation frameworks, the grounded se-
mantics is also defined. Since this is defined as the least fix-
point of the (monotone) characteristic operator, in this case
this is the unique grounded fixpoint. However, Strass (2013)
showed that this does not generalise to abstract dialectical
frameworks, where the grounded extension corresponds to
the (ultimate) Kripke-Kleene fixpoint.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we defined a new algebraical concept, namely
groundedness. We showed that grounded fixpoints behave
well with respect to other fixpoints studied in approximation
fixpoint theory: given an operator O and an approximator
A of O, all A-stable fixpoints are grounded for O and all
grounded fixpoints of O are approximated by the A-well-
founded fixpoint. Moreover, grounded fixpoints free us from
the need of choosing such an approximator: they are defined
directly in terms of the original lattice operator.
Grounded fixpoint semantics is the first purely two-valued
and algebraical semantics for logic programming. Moreover,
this semantics is compact, intuitive (directly based on the no-
tion of unfounded sets) and easily extensible: as long as the
(two-valued) immediate consequence operator is defined,
the grounded fixpoint semantics is obtained for free.
2The journal version of this paper will formally describe the ap-
plication of our theory to various fields, including a more detailed
discussion about the different notions of groundedness, Konolige’s
intuitions and the relation to grounded fixpoints.
Our theory can also be applied to AEL, DL, Dung’s argu-
mentation frameworks and ADFs where it also results in a
semantics with attractive properties.2
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A Proofs
Proposition 3.2. If O is a monotone operator and x is
grounded for O then x is a postfixpoint of O that is less than
lfp(O), i.e., x ≤ O(x) and x ≤ lfp(O).
Proof. First, we show that x ≤ lfp(O). Since O is mono-
tone, we have O(lfp(O) ∧ x) ≤ O(lfp(O)) = lfp(O).
Hence, groundedness of x with v = lfp(O) indeed yields
that x ≤ lfp(O).
In order to show that x is a postfixpoint of O, take v =
O(x). Again using monotonicity of O, we find O(v ∧ x) ≤
O(x) = v. Hence, groundedness yields that x ≤ v = O(x),
and indeed x is a postfixpoint of O.
Proposition 3.4. All grounded fixpoints of O are minimal
fixpoints of O.
Proof. Suppose x is grounded and y ≤ x are fixpoints of
O. In this case, O(x ∧ y) = O(y) = y ≤ y. Thus, since
x is grounded, we conclude that x ≤ y, which yields x =
y. We find that indeed, all grounded fixpoints are minimal
fixpoints.
Proposition 3.6. A monotone operator has exactly one
grounded fixpoint, namely its least fixpoint.
Proof. Proposition 3.4 guarantees that grounded fixpoints
are minimal, hence a monotone operator O can have at most
one grounded fixpoint lfp(O). Now we show that lfp(O) is
indeed grounded. Suppose that for some v,O(lfp(O)∧v) ≤
v. Since lfp(O) ∧ v ≤ lfp(O) and O is monotone, it also
holds that O(lfp(O)∧ v) ≤ lfp(O)∧ v. Hence lfp(O)∧ v is
a prefixpoint of O. However, lfp(O) is the least prefixpoint
of O, hence lfp(O) ≤ lfp(O) ∧ v, and thus lfp(O) ≤ v, and
we conclude that lfp(O) is indeed grounded.
Proposition 4.1. All ultimate stable fixpoints of O are
grounded.
Proof. Let x be an ultimate stable fixpoint of O. Thus x =
lfp(
∧
O([·, x])). Since O(x) = ∧O([x, x]), it follows that
x is also a fixpoint of O. Now, suppose O(x ∧ v) ≤ v; we
will show that x ≤ v. We know that∧
O([x ∧ v, x]) ≤ O(x ∧ v) ∧O(x) ≤ v ∧ x.
Thus, x ∧ v is a prefixpoint of the monotone operator∧
O([·, x]), Since the x is the least fixpoint (and also the
least prefixpoint) of that same operator, we find that x ≤
x ∧ v, and thus x ≤ v, which shows that x is grounded in-
deed.
Before giving the proof of Theorem 4.4, we recall the con-
structive characterisation of the A-well-founded fixpoint of
an operator O as been worked out by Denecker and Ven-
nekens (2007).
Definition A.1. An A-refinement of (x, y) is a pair
(x′, y′) ∈ L2 satisfying one of the following two conditions:
• (x, y)≤p (x′, y′)≤pA(x, y), or
• x′ = x and A(x, y′)2 ≤ y′ ≤ y.
An A-refinement is strict if (x, y) 6= (x′, y′).
Definition A.2. A well-founded induction of A is a se-
quence (xi, yi)i≤β with β an ordinal such that
• (x0, y0) = (⊥,>);
• (xi+1, yi+1) is an A-refinement of (xi, yi), for all i < β;
• (xλ, yλ) = lub≤p {(xi, yi) | i < λ} for each limit ordi-
nal λ ≤ β.
A well-founded induction is terminal if its limit (xβ , yβ) has
no strict A-refinements.
For a given approximator A, there are many different ter-
minal well-founded inductions of A. Denecker and Ven-
nekens (2007) showed that they all have the same limit,
which equals the A-well-founded fixpoint of O. Further-
more, if A is symmetric, the A-well-founded fixpoint of O
(and in fact, every tuple in a well-founded induction of A) is
consistent.
Theorem 4.4. The well-founded fixpoint (u, v) of a sym-
metric approximator A of O approximates all grounded fix-
points of O.
Proof. Let (ai, bi)i≤β be a well-founded induction of A and
let x be a grounded fixpoint of O. We show by induction
that for every i ≤ β, ai ≤ x ≤ bi. The results trivially holds
for i = 0 since (a0, b0) = (⊥,>). It is also clear that the
property is preserved in limit ordinals. Hence, all we need
to show is that the property is preserved by A-refinements.
Suppose (a′, b′) is an A-refinement of (a, b) and (a, b) ap-
proximates x. We distinguish two cases.
First, assume that (a, b)≤p (a′, b′)≤pA(a, b). Since x is
a fixpoint of O and A an approximator of O, we find that
x = O(x) ∈ A(x, x) ⊆ A(a, b) ⊆ (a′, b′).
On the other hand assume that a′ = a and A(a, b′)2 ≤
b′ ≤ b. A is symmetric, hence we know that b′ ≥ a. Since
also x ≥ a, we see that a ≤ x∧b′ ≤ b′. Hence x∧b′ ∈ [a, b′],
thus O(x ∧ b′) ∈ A(a, b′), and we see that O(x ∧ b′) ≤
A(a, b′)2 ≤ b′. Since x is grounded, this implies that x ≤ b′;
we conclude that also in this case x ∈ [a′, b′].
Thus, we have shown that every step in a well-founded
induction of A preserves all grounded fixpoints.
Proposition 5.3. Let P be a logic program, TP the cor-
responding direct consequence operator and I ∈ 2Σ an in-
terpretation. A set U ⊆ Σ is a 2-unfounded set of P with
respect to I if and only if TP(I ∧ U c) ≤ U c.
Proof. This is essentially a reformulation of the definition
of 2-unfounded set since I[U : f ] = I ∩ U c = I ∧ U c and
for every set X , X ≤ U c if and only if X ⊆ U c if and only
if X ∩ U = ∅.
Proposition 5.4. A structure I is grounded for TP if and
only if I does not contain any atoms that belong to a 2-
unfounded set U of P with respect to I .
Proof. First, suppose I is grounded for TP and U is a 2-
unfounded set of P with respect to I . Let V = U c. Since U
is a 2-unfounded set, TP(I ∧ V ) ≤ V , hence the definition
of groundedness yields I ≤ V , and hence that U ∩ I = ∅,
hence I is indeed disjoint from any 2-unfounded set.
The reverse direction is analogous. Suppose every 2-
unfounded set is disjoint from I . Let V be such that TP(I ∧
V ) ≤ V and let U = V c. Then again I[U : f ] = I ∧ V and
the result follows.
Theorem 5.6. The problem “given a finite propositional
logic program P , decide whether P has a grounded fix-
point” is ΣP2 -complete.
The proof of this theorem is heavily inspired by the proof
of a similar property for stable fixpoints (Theorem 6.12) in
(Denecker, Marek, and Truszczyn´ski 2004).
Proof. Given an interpretation I , the task of verifying that I
is a grounded fixpoint can be done by calculating TP(I[U :
f ]) for all candidate 2-unfounded sets, i.e., set U with U ⊆
I . Hence this task is in co-NP. Thus the task of deciding
whether there exists grounded fixpoint certainly is in the
class ΣP2 .
We now show ΣP2 -hardness of the problem of existence of
a grounded fixpoint of a program P . Let ϕ be propositional
formula in DNF over variables x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn. Re-
call that the problem of deciding whether there exists a truth
assignment I ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm} such that ϕI is a tautology,
where ϕI is the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing all
atoms xi ∈ I by t and all atoms xi 6∈ I by f . We now re-
duce this problem to our problem. For each xi, we introduce
a new variable x′i with as intended meaning the negation of
xi. Let ϕ′ be the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing all
literals ¬xi by x′i. We define a program P(ϕ) consisting of
the following clauses
1. xi ← ¬x′i and x′i ← ¬xi for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
2. yi ← ϕ′ for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
3. p← ϕ′,
4. q ← ¬p ∧ ¬q.
We will show that there is an I ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm} such that ϕI
is a tautology if and only if P (ϕ) has a grounded fixpoint. It
is easy to see that in each fixpoint M of TP(ϕ) the following
properties hold:
1. q is false in M (if q is true TP(ϕ) does not derive q),
2. p is true in M (otherwise TP(ϕ) derives q),
3. y1, . . . , yn are true in M (since their rules have the same
body as p),
4. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, exactly one of xi and x′i is true
in M .
Given a set I ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm}, we define I¯ = I ∪ {x′i |
xi 6∈ I}. It follows from the above properties that for each
fixpoint M of TP(ϕ), there exists an I such that
M = I¯ ∪ {p, y1, . . . , yn}.
Thus it suffices to show that if I ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm}, then
M = I¯ ∪ {p, y1, . . . , yn} is a grounded fixpoint of P(ϕ) if
and only if ϕI is a tautology.
In order to prove this, we fix I and M = I¯ ∪
{p, y1, . . . , yn}. Now, M is not a grounded fixpoint if and
only if there exists a non-empty U ⊆ M such that TP(M \
U) ∩ U = ∅. Since TP is anti-monotone when restricted to
the xi and x′i, each such U has the property that xi 6∈ U
and x′i 6∈ U . Hence U ⊆ {p, y1, . . . , yn}. Hence, such an U
has the property that ϕ′ is false in M \ U . But ϕ′ is false in
M \ U if and only if ϕI is false in {y1, . . . , yn} \ U . Thus,
we conclude that M is not a grounded fixpoint if and only
if there exists a truth assignment to J ⊆ {y1, . . . , yn} such
that ϕI is false in J . Thus, M is not a grounded fixpoint if
and only if ϕI is not a tautology, which is exactly what we
needed to show.
Proposition 6.3. Let P be a logic program, I a three-
valued interpretation and U ⊆ Σ. The following hold.
• If U is a 3-unfounded set, then U is a GRS-unfounded set.
• If I[U : f ] is more precise than I, then U is a GRS-
unfounded set if and only if U is a 3-unfounded set.
Proof. First, we recall that Fitting’s operator is defined by
ΨP(I)1 = {a ∈ Σ | ∃r ∈ P : body(r)I = t ∧ head(r) = a}
ΨP(I)2 = {a ∈ Σ | ∃r ∈ P : body(r)I 6= f ∧ head(r) = a}
Thus,U is a 3-unfounded set ofP with respect to any I if for
every a ∈ U , and every rule with head(r) = a, it holds that
body(r)I[U :f ] = f . This observation immediately proves the
first claim.
Now, if I and U are chosen such that I[U : f ] is more
precise than I, for every formula φ, the condition φI = f
or φI[U :f ] = f is equivalent with φI[U :f ] = f . Thus we con-
clude that in this case the notions of 3-unfounded set and
GRS-unfounded set are indeed equivalent, which proves the
second claim.
